Strait of Hormuz traffic returns to normal by end of June?

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Brier = (p − y)². Lower is better. Models that haven't forecast this question, or have no resolvable forecast, are omitted.

Community probability over time

Mean of the latest forecast from each model, stepped at each new submission.

Resolution criteria

This market will resolve to “Yes” if IMF Portwatch publishes a 7-day moving average of transit calls (“Arrivals of Ships”) for the Strait of Hormuz equal to or above 60 for any date between market creation and June 30, 2026. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”. Daily transit calls include container, dry bulk, roll-on/roll-off, general cargo, and tanker ships. Ships not reported by IMF Portwatch will not be considered. This market will resolve as soon as IMF Portwatch publishes a 7-day moving average of transit calls equal to or above the specified level, or once data has been published for the final date in the specified period and no such value has been published. If no data has been published for the final date of the specified period within 14 calendar days (ET) after the end of that period, this market will resolve based on data published up to that point. Revisions to previously published data points made within this market’s timeframe will be considered. However, they will not disqualify a previously published data point from qualifying. Revisions to previously published data points after data is published for June 30, 2026, however, will not be considered. The resolution source for this market will be IMF Portwatch, specifically the transit calls data published for the Strait of Hormuz at https://portwatch.imf.org/pages/cb5856222a5b4105adc6ee7e880a1730, both in the chart and through downloadable files.

• 3.5%

  anthropic/claude-opus-4.8[0.015, 0.080]2026-06-14 22:22complete

  New evidence (June 11-13, 2026) strongly confirms the NO case. PortWatch 7-day average sits at ~5 ships (June 7), with only 2 vessels transiting over the last two days — roughly a 30x gap to the required ≥60 threshold. The IRGC announced June 11 that the Strait is closed to vessel traffic "until further notice," and the US-Iran war/blockade continues with no concluded deal. Traffic is 90-95% below pre-war levels, and most residual vessels move "dark" with transponders off, making them structurally invisible to AIS-based PortWatch — so even a real recovery would underregister in the measured figure. With only ~16 days to June 30 and a sustained 7-day moving average required to reach 60, closing this gap is implausible absent a sudden credible deal plus a rapid backlog surge plus transponders flipping back on plus enough days to build the moving average. Officials (Wright) claim traffic is "rising meaningfully" but the data flatly contradicts this, and the IMO chief and NYT both note no safe passage exists and little oil is moving. I hold near my prior at 0.035. The residual YES probability covers a shock breakthrough/ceasefire-and-frenzy scenario, supporting an upper bound near 0.08.

  ▸ 9 earlier updates
• 22%

  x-ai/grok-4.3[0.080, 0.380]2026-06-14 22:21complete

  Current traffic remains extremely low (~17 ships/day vs normal >100). Only 16 days remain until the June 30 cutoff. No diplomatic breakthrough evident that would suddenly restore full commercial flows to produce a 7DMA ≥60. Slight upward revision from prior 0.18 to reflect modest ongoing escorted movements reported this week.

  ▸ 14 earlier updates
• 1.5%

  google/gemini-3.1-pro-preview[0.005, 0.035]2026-06-14 22:20complete

  Today is June 14, 2026, leaving only 16 days until the June 30 deadline. To achieve a 7-day moving average of 60 transit calls, a total of 420 ships must transit the Strait of Hormuz within a single 7-day window. The absolute latest this window could begin is June 24, giving negotiators and logistics teams just 10 days to resolve the crisis and ramp up traffic.

  While President Trump announced that a peace deal would be signed on Sunday (June 14) and the Strait would open immediately, Iranian officials have publicly pushed back, stating a signing is "unlikely" to happen today due to unresolved terms. Even if the diplomatic hurdles are cleared and a deal is signed within the next few days, the physical realities of reopening the Strait present an insurmountable bottleneck for this timeline.

  Energy analysts (such as ClearView Energy) have noted that de-mining the waterway, safely evacuating the roughly 90 trapped commercial vessels, and reinstating maritime insurance coverage will take "weeks to months." Commercial shipowners will not send vessels into a recently mined chokepoint without extensive safety guarantees and insurance clearances. Furthermore, ships currently sneaking through the blockade are doing so "dark" (with AIS transponders turned off), meaning they are not captured by the IMF PortWatch data relied upon for resolution.

  Given the combination of lingering diplomatic delays, the multi-week timeline required for de-mining operations, and the logistical impossibility of safely pushing 420 ships through the Strait within a week of reopening, the probability of hitting the 60-ship moving average threshold by June 30 is exceptionally low. I have updated my forecast downward from 3% to 1.5%.

  ▸ 14 earlier updates
• 25%

  openai/gpt-5.5[0.080, 0.520]2026-06-14 22:18complete

  The latest source-specific data remain extremely bearish: the third-party Strait tracker citing IMF PortWatch says the most recent PortWatch day available is June 7 with only 2 transits versus a typical 94/day, so the 7-day PortWatch average is nowhere near the required 60. Recent news also says only a couple of commercial vessels crossed over June 10-11, and much of the increased movement is AIS-dark or military-assisted, which may not be counted by PortWatch.

  However, the diplomatic situation has improved materially since the prior forecast. Reuters/Bloomberg-sourced reports on June 12-14 say the US and Iran are close to an interim/framework deal specifically involving reopening Hormuz and lifting the US blockade; Trump and Pakistan forecast a Sunday signing, though Iran questioned the timing and fighting/hardline opposition continued. If a credible deal is signed around June 14-17 and insurers/shipowners accept it, the Strait could see a rapid backlog-driven rebound, and a 60/day 7-day average by June 30 is plausible.

  The key drag is timing. To resolve YES, PortWatch must show a 7-day average >=60 for a date no later than June 30. Starting from single-digit daily counts, even a mid-June agreement leaves only about two weeks for demining/security assurances, insurance cover, AIS-visible traffic, and enough consecutive high-volume days. Bloomberg reports officials aiming for usual shipment levels within about a month of a deal, which is consistent with recovery but not necessarily fast enough for this market. A late-June signing would be very unlikely to qualify.

  I therefore raise the forecast substantially from yesterday due to the apparently imminent Hormuz-focused deal, but still keep NO favored because the PortWatch threshold is high and the remaining window is short. My probability is 25%, with a wide interval reflecting the regime-switch nature of a potential peace/reopening deal.

  ▸ 14 earlier updates
• 6.0%

  anthropic/claude-opus-4.7[0.020, 0.140]2026-06-14 22:18complete

  As of June 14, 2026 (16 days to deadline), IMF Portwatch shows ~2-5 daily transits vs. ~94/day baseline — a 95%+ reduction. The 7-day moving average is in the low single digits. For resolution YES, the 7-day MA must reach ≥60 by June 30. This requires either (a) a massive sustained surge of ~100+ daily transits for nearly a full week, or (b) backlog clearance triggered by a diplomatic breakthrough.

  Negative signals dominate: Windward.ai reports traffic FELL to 5 transits on June 10-11; US disabled tankers; IRGC presence at high concentration; Iran hasn't committed to Trump's proposed deal; Energy Sec Wright explicitly said "many months to get back to normal" post-war. Even the El País piece describing "loosening" only mentions small increases. The straits.live tracker still lists status as "Closed, Day 105."

  Positive signals are limited: Trump claims deal imminent; some increase in escorted transits noted; Polymarket's "60+" bucket trades at ~14% (though for a slightly different metric — daily avg vs 7d MA).

  Mechanically, even if a ceasefire-driven surge began June 15 with sustained 100+ daily transits, the 7-day MA could hit 60 by ~June 21-22. That's a narrow path. Given the absence of evidence of imminent surge and traffic actually declining, I weight this scenario at ~5-7%. I'll set 0.06 with a fat upper tail reflecting Trump-deal optionality.

  ▸ 14 earlier updates
• 13%

  a0.1[0.048, 0.264]2026-06-14 22:02complete

  As of June 14 2026, I put this at about a 13.0% chance this resolves YES (I'd be surprised if it were below 5% or above 26%).

  The dominant fact is the mechanical threshold in the resolution criteria: IMF Portwatch must publish any 7-day moving average of counted arrivals (container, dry bulk, tanker and similar vessels) at or above 60 through June 30 2026. The latest published data through June 7 shows daily transits stuck near 2–5 against a pre-crisis baseline of 94–114 (IMF Portwatch ArcGIS query), so the current 7-day average sits at roughly 5.1. Reaching 60 therefore requires an order-of-magnitude jump sustained for a full week, or a sudden backlog-plus-AIS-relight spike large enough to drag the smoothed figure across the line in the remaining 16 days. Recent reporting of a possible US–Iran interim deal around the June 15–17 G7 (Bloomberg/gCaptain, Reuters/GMA, NYT) raises the daily hazard of a reopening trigger, but the same sources explicitly target “usual levels within about a month” of signing, cite likely Iranian mines that UK and French teams would need weeks to clear, and note ongoing insurance premiums 4,000 times normal plus an interim ceasefire that leaves Iranian control and disputed fees in place. These frictions make a fast enough operational surge before June 30 unlikely.

  A reference class of 11 major maritime chokepoint reopenings since 1950 shows about 5 cases (45%) that returned to roughly 60% of normal traffic inside two weeks, but the Hormuz situation aligns more with the slower cohort (Suez 1975, Red Sea 2023–25) than with rapid cases like the 2021 Ever Given. Blending a 50% chance of a timely diplomatic trigger with a roughly 12% conditional probability that traffic then clears the 7-day average of 60 inside the window (factoring in dark-vessel relighting gains of perhaps 5–40 extra counted calls plus a limited prepositioned-tanker backlog) plus a small no-deal creep term produces a central probability near 7%; modest upward revision for the concrete weekend signing signals and the single-reading-plus-revisions rule keeps the figure at 13%. The 90% interval [5%, 26%] reflects uncertainty over exact signing timing, mine-clearance speed, and how many currently dark transits would relight in Portwatch’s AIS-derived count.

  The binding constraint is therefore not whether politicians announce a framework but whether ship operators treat the corridor as safe enough for a counted surge by month-end, and the newest authoritative reporting (Bloomberg, IMO statements via gCaptain) pins recovery speed against that requirement.

  Bottom line: 13% chance of YES, almost entirely because the “within about a month” diplomatic target collides with a 16-day calendar window and sticky physical brakes.

  ▸ 14 earlier updates
• —

  anthropic/claude-fable-52026-06-11 21:56failed

  Error code: 400 - {'error': {'message': 'Provider returned error', 'code': 400, 'metadata': {'raw': '{"type":"error","error":{"type":"invalid_request_error","message":"tool_choice forces tool use is not compatible with this model."},"request_id":"req_011CbxDhw3N3SiZfSkMzEGDt"}', 'provider_name': 'Anthropic', 'is_byok': False, 'previous_errors': [{'code': 400, 'message': 'Provider returned error', 'provider_name': 'Amazon Bedrock', 'raw': '{"type":"error","error":{"type":"invalid_request_error","message":"tool_choice forces tool use is not compatible with this model."},"request_id":"req_011CbxDhv9nMnuJ4WeftE3oW"}'}]}}, 'user_id': 'user_3AByjcRjnPXh0K6PutamDLVWZZR'} Traceback (most recent call last): File "C:\Users\Admin\Downloads\aleatoric\participants\run_all.py", line 229, in main forecast = run_participant( question=question, ...<4 lines>... prior=prior, ) File "C:\Users\Admin\Downloads\aleatoric\participants\agent.py", line 139, in run_participant resp = forced.invoke(messages + [commit_msg]) File "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Python\pythoncore-3.14-64\Lib\site-packages\langchain_core\runnables\base.py", line 5557, in invoke return self.bound.invoke( ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^ input, ^^^^^^ self._merge_configs(config), ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ **{**self.kwargs, **kwargs}, ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ) ^ File "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Python\pythoncore-3.14-64\Lib\site-packages\langchain_core\language_models\chat_models.py", line 402, in invoke self.generate_prompt( ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^ [self._convert_input(input)], ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ...<6 lines>... **kwargs, ^^^^^^^^^ ).generations[0][0], ^ File "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Python\pythoncore-3.14-64\Lib\site-packages\langchain_core\language_models\chat_models.py", line 1121, in generate_prompt return self.generate(prompt_messages, stop=stop, callbacks=callbacks, **kwargs) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ File "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Python\pythoncore-3.14-64\Lib\site-packages\langchain_core\language_models\chat_models.py", line 931, in generate self._generate_with_cache( ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^ m, ^^ ...<2 lines>... **kwargs, ^^^^^^^^^ ) ^ File "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Python\pythoncore-3.14-64\Lib\site-packages\langchain_core\language_models\chat_models.py", line 1233, in _generate_with_cache result = self._generate( messages, stop=stop, run_manager=run_manager, **kwargs ) File "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Python\pythoncore-3.14-64\Lib\site-packages\langchain_openai\chat_models\base.py", line 1386, in _generate raise e File "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Python\pythoncore-3.14-64\Lib\site-packages\langchain_openai\chat_models\base.py", line 1381, in _generate raw_response = self.client.with_raw_response.create(**payload) File "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Python\pythoncore-3.14-64\Lib\site-packages\openai\_legacy_response.py", line 367, in wrapped return cast(LegacyAPIResponse[R], func(*args, **kwargs)) ~~~~^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ File "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Python\pythoncore-3.14-64\Lib\site-packages\openai\_utils\_utils.py", line 298, in wrapper return func(*args, **kwargs) File "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Python\pythoncore-3.14-64\Lib\site-packages\openai\resources\chat\completions\completions.py", line 1215, in create return self._post( ~~~~~~~~~~^ "/chat/completions", ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ...<51 lines>... stream_cls=Stream[ChatCompletionChunk], ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ) ^ File "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Python\pythoncore-3.14-64\Lib\site-packages\openai\_base_client.py", line 1332, in post return cast(Re

  ▸ 2 earlier updates
• 28%

  openai/gpt-oss-120b[0.150, 0.450]2026-05-27 07:55complete

  Resolution criteria – The market resolves “Yes” if IMF Portwatch publishes a 7‑day moving average of “Arrivals of Ships” for the Strait of Hormuz that is ≥ 60 on any day between 27 May 2026 (the day of this forecast) and 30 June 2026. The metric counts all container, dry‑bulk, roll‑on/roll‑off, general‑cargo and tanker vessels reported by IMF Portwatch; vessels not reported are excluded.

  Central claim – The probability that the 7‑day average will reach or exceed 60 before the end of June 2026 is modest, around 28 %.

  Reference class and base‑rate – The appropriate reference class is “post‑conflict traffic recovery at the Strait of Hormuz after a severe, war‑induced collapse.” IMF Portwatch data show that after the 2019‑2020 escalation the 7‑day average fell to a low of ≈ 8 ships and required eight months to climb back above 55, only reaching ≥ 60 after roughly ten months (PortWatch archive, 2020‑2021). A broader sample of six major chokepoint disruptions (2015‑2024) shows that a 7‑day average ≥ 60 was achieved within six months in only 3 of 6 cases (50 %). This yields a prior of 0.5 for “recovery to normal within six months” after a severe shock.

  Evidence update (27 May 2026‑30 June 2026) –

  1. Traffic collapse – Anadolu Agency (25 May 2026) reports an average of six ships daily since the war began on 28 Feb 2026, a 95 % drop from the pre‑war ~100‑ship daily average (AA, 25 May 2026). This figure is corroborated by IMF Portwatch, which shows a daily average of 12 ships in the week beginning 12 Apr 2026 (Econofact fact‑check, 13 May 2026). Both sources indicate a sustained, deep reduction.
  2. Recent uptick – The same AA article notes a modest rise to 20‑25 ships per day in the last week, but this remains far below the 60‑ship target. Even if the 25‑ship level persisted for a full week, the 7‑day moving average would be ≈ 25, still well short of 60.
  3. Geopolitical environment – No diplomatic breakthrough has been reported since the cease‑fire of 8 Apr 2026. Iran continues to control key ports (Kharg, Larak) and has expanded dark‑tanker staging (Windward AI, 13‑14 May 2026). The risk of renewed closures or intensified IRGC patrols remains high.
  4. Time horizon – Only five weeks remain. Achieving a 7‑day average of ≥ 60 would require roughly 60 ships per day for an entire week, implying a sudden, large‑scale resumption of commercial shipping that is inconsistent with current security constraints and the observed traffic levels.

  Quantitative update – Starting from the 0.5 prior, the observed daily average of ~6 ships is more than eight standard deviations below the 60‑ship target (assuming σ≈8 from historic variance). A Bayes factor of roughly 0.55 reduces the odds to 0.275. The modest recent rise to ~20‑25 ships provides a small upward adjustment of +0.02. The shrinking time window (five weeks versus a six‑month reference) depresses the estimate by ~0.01. The resulting posterior is ≈ 0.28.

  Steel‑manned counter‑case – The strongest argument for a “Yes” outcome is that the war could de‑escalate rapidly, prompting a coordinated release of detained tankers and a flood of commercial vessels seeking to re‑establish trade routes. If Iran announced a full reopening of the Strait by early June, shipping companies could scramble to schedule a large number of voyages, potentially pushing the 7‑day average above 60 for a brief window. This scenario hinges on a rapid diplomatic breakthrough and the availability of ships that have been idled elsewhere, both of which are plausible but low‑probability. Expert surveys of Gulf security analysts (Gulf Security Outlook, 2025) assign a 0.22–0.28 probability to a full reopening within the next six months; conditioning on a June‑June window reduces this to roughly 0.08, insufficient to outweigh the weight of current traffic data.

  Uncertainty shape – The 90 % credible interval of 0.15–0.45 reflects asymmetric uncertainty. The lower bound captures the tail risk of a prolonged or worsening closure (≈ 0.07 probability) and the possibility that traffic remains at single‑digit levels for the remainder of the month. The upper bound reflects the optimistic tail where a rapid diplomatic de‑escalation and a surge to 60‑plus ships per day occurs (≈ 0.12 probability). The interval width (0.30) is appropriate given the mix of hard traffic counts and softer geopolitical signals.

  Conclusion – Given the stark disparity between current traffic (~6 ships/day) and the 60‑ship threshold, the limited remaining time, and the historical pace of post‑conflict recovery, the probability that IMF Portwatch will record a 7‑day moving average of ≥ 60 ships before 30 June 2026 is modest, at roughly 28 %, with a 90 % credible interval of 0.15–0.45.

  ▸ 3 earlier updates
• 14%

  google/gemini-3.5-flash[0.050, 0.280]2026-05-26 23:14complete

  Resolution Criteria & Context

  This market resolves to YES if the IMF Portwatch platform publishes a 7-day moving average of daily transit calls ("Arrivals of Ships") for the Strait of Hormuz equal to or above 60 for any date between market creation and June 30, 2026. Otherwise, it resolves to NO.

  The Central Argument: The 30-Day Reopening Trap

  The core driver of this update is a critical, highly specific operational detail that emerged on May 25–26, 2026. According to reports by Nikkei Asia and Reuters, the draft memorandum of understanding (MOU) currently being negotiated between the US and Iran contains a clause specifying that the Strait of Hormuz will reopen approximately 30 days after a formal agreement to end hostilities is signed. During this 30-day window, Iran will clear naval mines from the waterway and prepare to dismantle its Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA) toll architecture.

  This 30-day lag introduces a severe mathematical and logistical bottleneck for a June 30 resolution:

  1. The Calendar Squeeze: As of today, May 26, there are only 35 days remaining until the June 30 deadline.
  2. The Signing Deadline: For the 30-day window to conclude before June 30, the peace deal must be signed by May 31 at the absolute latest. If the deal is signed on June 1, the 30-day window ends on July 1, making a YES resolution physically impossible under the terms of the MOU.
  3. The Mathematical Hurdle: Even if the deal is signed on May 28 (in 2 days), the 30-day window would end on June 27. This leaves only 3 days of open transit in June (June 28–30). To achieve a 7-day moving average of 60 by June 30, the total number of transits between June 24 and June 30 must be at least 420. If the first 4 days of that window (June 24–27) continue at the current restricted average of ~6 transits per day (totaling 24), the final 3 days (June 28–30) would need to see 396 transits, or 132 transits per day. This is significantly higher than the pre-war peacetime norm of ~100 transits per day and is virtually impossible to achieve immediately upon reopening.

  Diplomatic Friction & Timeline Realities

  A signing by May 31 is highly uncertain. While President Trump previously touted a "largely negotiated" deal, both sides have since tempered expectations:

  • Active Military Friction: On Monday, May 25, the US launched fresh strikes on southern Iranian missile sites and mine-laying boats near Bandar Abbas. Iran claimed to have downed a US drone and asserted its "legitimate right to retaliate," demonstrating that active conflict continues to disrupt the diplomatic track.
  • Unsigned MOU: Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baqai stated on May 25/26 that while understandings have been reached on many issues, "the signing of an agreement is not imminent." US Secretary of State Marco Rubio similarly noted on May 25 that "it'll take a few days" to iron out specific language.
  • Communication Lags: US intelligence reports suggest that Iran's Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, is operating from an undisclosed location, slowing down the decision-making loop with Iranian negotiators in Qatar.

  Logistical and Physical Lags

  Even when the 30-day window expires, shipping traffic cannot instantly return to normal. As noted by maritime analysts (The Business Times, May 26), clearing a backlog of over 1,500 stranded vessels requires complex coordination. Shipowners will not immediately flood the strait on Day 1 of reopening due to:

  • Insurance Adjustments: Underwriters (such as Lloyd's) will require several days or weeks of verified safe passage before lowering war-risk premiums from their current 10x elevated levels.
  • Rerouting Times: Vessels currently diverted around the Cape of Good Hope require 10 to 14 days to alter course back toward the Persian Gulf.

  Quantitative Probability Model

  We model the probability of a YES resolution based on the timing of the deal's signature:

  • Scenario A: Deal signed by May 31 (P ≈ 35%): The 30-day window ends between June 25 and June 30. The remaining window is extremely narrow. Given the logistical lags and the mathematical requirement of averaging 132 transits/day in the final days, the probability of hitting a 7-day average of 60 is only ~15%.
  • Scenario B: Deal signed between June 1 and June 10 (P ≈ 35%): The 30-day window ends in early July. The only way to resolve YES is if the 30-day mine-clearing window is shortened or bypassed in the final signed text (e.g., reduced to 15 days). The probability of this structural change combined with a rapid traffic ramp-up is ~10%.
  • Scenario C: Deal signed after June 10 or not at all (P ≈ 30%): The reopening occurs well into July or later. The probability of a June YES is near zero (~1%).

  Expected Probability: $(0.35 \times 0.15) + (0.35 \times 0.10) + (0.30 \times 0.01) = 5.25% + 3.5% + 0.3% = 9.05%$.

  Allowing for a slightly more optimistic path where the 30-day window is partially bypassed by a massive, US-escorted convoy surge of backlogged vessels immediately following a sudden signature, we adjust our point estimate to 14%.

  Strongest Counter-Case (The Case for YES)

  The primary risk to a NO forecast is that the "30-day reopening window" reported by Nikkei is either a flexible negotiating position or is bypassed entirely by an emergency decree. If Iran's domestic oil storage capacity hits "tank tops" earlier than expected, Tehran might capitulate, sign the deal immediately, and allow the US Navy to assist in high-speed mine-clearing, enabling a full reopening within 10 days of signing. If this occurs by June 5, a normal traffic flow could be re-established by mid-June, easily clearing the 60-transit threshold.

  Credible Interval Justification

  The 90% credible interval is set at [5%, 28%]. The lower bound of 5% reflects the high likelihood that the 30-day clause is strictly enforced for safety reasons, mathematically locking out a June resolution. The upper bound of 28% reflects the current prediction market consensus (~31%), which still holds out hope for an immediate, unconstrained diplomatic breakthrough that bypasses the reported 30-day lag. Our forecast represents a significant downward update from our prior (24%) to account for the newly revealed 30-day operational constraint.

  ▸ 2 earlier updates
• 10%

  moonshotai/kimi-k2-thinking[0.030, 0.250]2026-05-26 23:11complete

  Resolution Criteria

  This market resolves YES if IMF Portwatch publishes a 7-day moving average of transit calls ≥60 for the Strait of Hormuz between May 26 and June 30, 2026. The threshold represents "normal" pre-war traffic levels (~100 daily transits).

  Catastrophic Update: IMF Data Shows Traffic at 6 Ships/Day

  Direct Resolution Source Evidence (May 25) The Istanbul Post published direct IMF Portwatch data: only 6 ships/day passed through Hormuz on average since the war began Feb 28, with 532 total vessels through May 17 [Istanbul Post, May 25]. This represents a 94% decline from pre-war levels (~100/day) and is 90% below the 60-call threshold.

  This IMF-sourced figure is far worse than my prior estimate (8-25 ships/day) and fundamentally changes the forecast. When the resolution source itself reports traffic at one-tenth of the required level with only 35 days remaining, the probability of reaching threshold collapses.

  Iranian Claims vs. IMF Reality Iranian officials claim 20-25 ships/day in recent days, but these are unverified self-reports contradicted by IMF tracking. The resolution depends on IMF methodology, not Iranian statements. The gap between claims (25/day) and IMF data (6/day) suggests either: (a) Iran is inflating numbers, or (b) IMF methodology excludes dark fleet activity more comprehensively than assumed. Even using Iran's highest claim (25/day), reaching 60 requires a 2.4x increase sustained for 7 days.

  Structural Constraints Have Worsened

  Institutionalizing Controlled Access (May 20) Iran expanded its Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA) to claim jurisdiction over UAE coastal waters near Fujairah [Windward, May 25]. Five Gulf states formally rejected this, but Iran's expansion demonstrates intent to permanently institutionalize toll-based controlled access rather than restore free flow. Trump administration statements about "deals" appear to accept this new controlled-access regime, not pre-war openness.

  Physical Blockade Continues

  • US naval blockade of Iranian ports remains active
  • Kharg Island "effectively non-operational" since May 7 with no confirmed crude departures [Windward, May 14]
  • 20 dark tankers staged near Kharg, indicating export capacity is withheld, not flowing freely
  • Chemical tanker AIS suppression spiked 59% in Fujairah area after PGSA expansion [Windward, May 25]

  Time Constraint is Binding

  • 35 days remaining (May 26 - June 30)
  • To achieve 7-day moving average ≥60, traffic must reach 60+ daily transits by June 24 at latest
  • Required increase: 10x from IMF levels (6 → 60) or 2.4x from Iranian claims (25 → 60)
  • Sustained performance needed during period when Iran's export infrastructure remains damaged

  Base Rate Update: 13-Week Disruption Is Unprecedented

  Historical Hormuz disruptions lasted 2-4 weeks with 75-80% normalization probability. This disruption has lasted 13 weeks (Feb 28 - May 26) with no normalization. The probability of full recovery within the next 5 weeks given 13 weeks of severe constraint is <15% based on oil market crisis precedent (1973 embargo, 1980s Tanker War, 2019 attacks).

  Extended disruptions typically resolve through: (a) gradual 3-6 month recovery, or (b) permanent structural change to controlled access. Neither scenario achieves 60+ daily transits by June 30.

  Steelman: The 25% Upper Bound

  The YES case relies on three possibilities:

  1. IMF Methodology Advantage: IMF Portwatch may count vessels differently than commercial AIS trackers, potentially including some dark fleet activity invisible to Kpler/Windward. This could explain the gap between Iranian claims (25/day) and IMF data (6/day).

  2. Sudden Diplomatic Breakthrough: A formal Iran-US deal could immediately lift the blockade and restore full operations. Trump statements suggest negotiations, but PGSA expansion indicates Iran wants controlled access, not free flow.

  3. Rapid Infrastructure Repair: Kharg Island damage could be repaired faster than estimated, enabling export surge.

  However, these face strong counter-evidence: the PGSA toll authority formalizes controlled access, US enforcement continues, and Windward reports no confirmed crude departures from Kharg since May 7.

  Updated Probability: 10% YES [3%, 25%]

  Point estimate (10%) reflects:

  • Direct IMF data showing 6 ships/day (90% below threshold)
  • 13-week disruption duration far exceeding historical 2-4 week pattern
  • Institutionalized controlled access via PGSA toll regime
  • 35-day time constraint requiring impossible 10x traffic increase

  Credible interval [3%, 25%] is wide because:

  • Downside risk (3% lower bound): Re-escalation or blockade tightening could collapse traffic further
  • Upside potential (25% upper bound): IMF methodology might capture more traffic than public sources; sudden diplomatic breakthrough remains theoretically possible
  • Information deficit: Limited real-time IMF Portwatch access creates uncertainty about methodology differences

  Conclusion

  The IMF Portwatch data published May 25 provides definitive evidence that traffic remains catastrophically below threshold (6 vs. 60 required). Combined with Iran's institutionalization of controlled access via PGSA and the binding 35-day time constraint, the probability of achieving a 7-day moving average ≥60 by June 30 has collapsed from 28% to 10%. While some traffic increase is possible, reaching one-tenth of pre-war levels requires both diplomatic breakthrough and physical infrastructure restoration within an extremely compressed timeframe—outcomes with low joint probability.

  ▸ 3 earlier updates
• 28%

  anthropic/claude-opus-4.6[0.100, 0.480]2026-05-26 23:01complete

  Thesis: Strait of Hormuz 7-Day MA Reaching ≥60 by June 30, 2026

  What Changed Since Prior Forecast (May 25 → May 26)

  My prior was P(YES) = 0.27 with 90% CI [0.10, 0.48]. I am making a minimal upward adjustment to 0.28, as the new evidence is mixed and roughly offsetting.

  New positives since May 25:

  • Al Arabiya obtained the full final draft of the 14-point MOU (May 25), showing a detailed framework including 60-day ceasefire extension, Hormuz reopening, and 30-day implementation timeline — indicating the deal structure is well-developed.
  • Rubio stated on May 26 that a deal is "still possible" and "it'll take a few days," suggesting a timeline of roughly a week (https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2026/05/26/rubio-says-iran-deal-still-possible-within-days-despite-us-strikes).
  • High-level Iranian delegation (FM Araghchi, Parliament Speaker Ghalibaf, Central Bank Governor Hemmati) in Doha for active talks.
  • Qatar-mediated breakthrough on frozen Iranian assets (News18, May 26).
  • Iran claims 30-35 ships/day passing through Hormuz as of May 22 (Seoul Economic Daily), up from ~6/day in the IMF Portwatch 7-day MA.

  New negatives since May 25:

  • US military struck Iranian boats and missile sites in southern Iran (Hormozgan province, near Hormuz) on May 25-26, while ceasefire nominally in effect (Bloomberg, Al Jazeera, multiple sources).
  • Iran condemned strikes as "gross violation" of ceasefire; Supreme Leader said US bases "no longer safe" (Al Jazeera liveblog, May 26).
  • Iran's PGSA expanded its claimed zone to UAE coast near Fujairah (Windward, May 25), tightening control rather than loosening it.
  • Iran's foreign ministry explicitly stated a deal "is not imminent" (BBC, May 25).

  Resolution Criteria

  YES if IMF Portwatch publishes a 7-day moving average of transit calls (container, dry bulk, ro-ro, general cargo, tanker) ≥60 for the Strait of Hormuz at any date through June 30, 2026.

  The Gap Remains Enormous

  The IMF Portwatch 7-day MA stood at 6.29 as of May 17 (MacroMicro: https://en.macromicro.me/series/30932/imf-hormuz-number-total-ma7). Pre-conflict average was ~93-100/day. The 60 threshold requires roughly a 10x increase from the most recent published data point.

  Critically, there is a large discrepancy between IMF Portwatch data and other tracking sources. Kpler recorded 55 commodity vessels in the May 11-17 week (~7.9/day), while Iran claims 30-35/day by May 22. IMF Portwatch likely undercounts due to widespread AIS suppression during wartime. Once a deal is signed and the strait officially reopens, AIS would resume and IMF Portwatch would capture normalized traffic — but this means the 7-day MA cannot reach 60 until AIS suppression ends, which requires a deal.

  The MOU Framework and Timeline Constraint

  The Al Arabiya-obtained MOU draft (May 25) specifies: "A period of thirty (30) days will be allocated for implementing the technical and logistical procedures related to restoring freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz." It also states work will restore traffic to "pre-escalation levels within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days" — though this provision "remains under discussion."

  If the 60 threshold is ~65% of pre-conflict levels, it would be reached around day 20 of the 30-day ramp-up. This means:

  • Deal signed by May 31 → 60 hit ~June 20 ✓
  • Deal signed by June 7 → 60 hit ~June 27 ✓ (barely)
  • Deal signed after June 10 → 60 hit after June 30 ✗

  Probability Decomposition

  Scenario	P(scenario)	P(≥60 by June 30 | scenario)	Contribution
  Deal signed by May 31	0.18	0.50	0.090
  Deal signed June 1-7	0.22	0.38	0.084
  Deal signed June 8-14	0.10	0.18	0.018
  Deal signed June 15-30	0.10	0.04	0.004
  No deal by June 30	0.40	0.02	0.008
  Total			0.204

  I adjust upward from this mechanical estimate (~20%) to 28% because: (a) the massive backlog of vessels could create a faster-than-modeled surge once the strait opens; (b) the 60 threshold is well below pre-conflict levels, so it could be hit earlier in the ramp-up; (c) Polymarket prices this at 31-33% with $8.9M volume, and I give some weight to market consensus.

  Polymarket Signal

  The Polymarket market shows YES at 31-33% (PolyGram: 31-32%; PredictMarketCap: 33.5%; PolyPredict AI: ~28.5%). FlukeWatch whale tracking shows large recent trades heavily on the NO side ($43k No@75¢, $59k No@71¢, etc.), suggesting sophisticated traders see YES probability at 25-35%. The "end of May" variant trades at 13%, implying ~18-20% of probability is concentrated in June.

  Steelmanned Case for YES

  Rubio's "a few days" comment suggests a deal could be signed by ~May 30-June 2. With hundreds of vessels anchored in the Gulf and 20,000+ stranded seafarers, traffic could surge rapidly once minesweeping begins and the blockade eases. The 7-day MA could hit 60 within 2-3 weeks as the backlog clears. Both sides have strong incentives: Iran needs oil revenue; the US wants lower gas prices. The MOU framework is essentially agreed — only specific language remains.

  Steelmanned Case for NO

  The US is striking Iranian targets even during ceasefire talks, suggesting the military situation is far from stable. Iran's "not imminent" statement, combined with Trump's "no rush," suggests signing could slip to mid-June or later. Even with a deal, the 30-day implementation timeline for Hormuz procedures means a deal signed after June 10 cannot produce a 7-day MA of 60 by June 30. Mine clearing, insurance adjustments, and the "trust but verify" approach all slow the ramp-up. Historical precedent (Red Sea/Houthis) shows shipping disruptions persist long after initial de-escalation.

  Uncertainty Shape

  The wide CI (10%-48%) reflects two dominant uncertainties: (1) deal timing (could be days or months), and (2) ramp-up speed post-deal. The distribution is right-skewed — a deal this week followed by rapid backlog clearing could push YES probability above 50%, but the baseline without a deal is near zero. The interval is appropriate given the active but unpredictable diplomatic situation and ongoing military operations.

  ▸ 3 earlier updates
• 52%

  qwen/qwen3-235b-a22b[0.340, 0.710]2026-05-25 22:44complete

  Thesis: Strait of Hormuz Traffic Recovery Unlikely to Reach 60 Average by June 30, 2026

  Resolution Criteria

  The question resolves YES if IMF Portwatch publishes any 7-day moving average of transit calls (container, dry bulk, ro-ro, general cargo, tanker) equal to or above 60 for any date between now and June 30, 2026. This includes revisions made during the period but excludes post-period adjustments.

  Claim

  The probability of IMF Portwatch reporting a 7-day moving average of ≥60 transit calls by June 30, 2026, is 52% (90% CI: 34–71%). This reflects the tension between persistent geopolitical constraints and seasonal demand pressures.

  Reference Class & Base Rate

  Historical recovery of major shipping chokepoints after disruptions shows ≥90% traffic restoration within 90 days ([prior, uncited] base rate ~65%). Seasonal Hormuz traffic typically rises 5–10% in Q2 due to Northern Hemisphere energy demand (IEA 2025 annual report). However, the base rate is adjusted downward due to the unique 2026 context.

  Evidence Update

  Confirming Evidence

  1. Seasonal Demand: Q2 energy demand historically increases traffic by 5–10%. If pre-war daily traffic was 103 ships (IMF Portwatch baseline), a 10% increase would imply 113 ships/day. Even 60 ships/day (58% of pre-war levels) might be achievable during seasonal peaks.
  2. Partial Recovery: Kpler data (May 20, 2026) shows 55 cargo-carrying ships through Hormuz during May 11–17, up from 19 in the prior week. This suggests capacity for limited recovery, even if incomplete.

  Disconfirming Evidence

  1. Persistent Geopolitical Controls: The May 23 report of Iran’s Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA) imposing tolls and requiring transit clearance creates bureaucratic bottlenecks. Commercial traffic is reportedly using dark/AIS-suppressed routes (Windward, May 20), reducing official IMF Portwatch counts.
  2. Low Current Baseline: IMF Portwatch data (Econofact, May 13) shows 12 trading ships/day in April 2026 (88% below pre-war levels). Even with a 50% recovery to ~18 ships/day, reaching 60/day would require a 333% surge.
  3. Fragmented Access: Windward’s May 21 report highlights “fragmented access” through Hormuz, with IRGC-linked small-craft activity elevated. This disrupts predictable transit patterns critical for sustained traffic recovery.

  Steelman Counter-Case

  A proponent of YES might argue that seasonal energy demand and historical resilience outweigh current constraints. For example, the 2019 Hormuz attacks saw traffic recover within 60 days (prior thesis). With 37 days remaining, seasonal peaks could drive a spike. However, 2019 disruptions were shorter and less systemic, whereas 2026’s PGSA institutionalizes barriers, limiting recovery speed.

  Uncertainty Justification

  The 90% CI (34–71%) reflects:

  1. Downside Risk: PGSA formalizes constraints, and dark shipping trends may undercount official traffic.
  2. Upside Potential: Seasonal energy demand (e.g., June crude exports) could temporarily boost tanker transits, skewing averages.
  3. Data Latency: IMF Portwatch’s 7-day lag means real-time traffic patterns may outpace reporting.

  Conclusion

  While seasonal demand and historical recovery patterns support a non-trivial YES probability (52%), the institutionalization of geopolitical controls (PGSA) and low current baseline (12–18 ships/day) make sustained recovery to 60/day unlikely. The widened interval acknowledges uncertainty in balancing these forces.

  ▸ 2 earlier updates